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A FEW INCONVENIENT TRUTHS ABOUT
MICHAEL CRICHTON'S STATE OF FEAR:
LAWYERS, CAUSES AND SCIENCE
Lea B. Vaughn*
"Art rediscovers, generation by generation, what is
necessary to humanness."
John Gardner, On Moral Fiction'
"It ain't what you don't know that gets you into trouble.
It's what you know for sure that just ain't so."
Mark Twain
Cited in
Al Gore, An Inconvenient Truth2
Although Crichton has lost the battle regarding global
warming, his characterization of lawyers and law practice
remains unchallenged. This article challenges his damning
portrait of lawyers as know-nothing, self-aggrandizing
manipulators of various social and environmental causes. A
more nuanced examination of "cause lawyering" reveals that
lawyers are not part of a vast conspiracy to grab power
through the causes for which many work; in fact, the rules of
professional responsibility as well as the structure of "cause
lawyering" limit their power and influence. Regardless,
lawyers are nonetheless vital, and generally principled,
participants in the debates and causes that inform
environmental (and other scientific) policy-making in a
* Professor of Law, University of Washington. A.B., 1975, Princeton University; J.D.,
1978, University of Michigan. Support for this article was provided by the University of
Washington Law School Foundation as well as funding for a sabbatical provided by the
University of Washington and the University of Washington School of Law.
1. JOHN GARDNER, ON MORAL FICTION, 6 (Basic Books 2000) (1978).
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49
50 Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law [Vol. 20.1
democratic society.
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INTRODUCTION
State of Fear,3 Michael Crichton's controversial and very
ponderous novel, is about global warming. More accurately,
the novel is a foil for Crichton's argument that the
assumption that global warming exists and has been caused
by human behaviors is questionable, at best. This article, on
the other hand, is about lawyers; global warming is
secondary. How are they connected? In this techno-thriller,
the plot is advanced through the actions of four characters, all
lawyers. Each character illustrates different visions of legal
practice that are the focus of this article.
A well-known writer of techno-thrillers that frequently
become movies, and the creator of ER 4, Crichton was more
than an author. Prior to beginning his writing career,
3. MICHAEL CRICHTON, STATE OF FEAR (Harper Collins 2004) [hereinafter
CRICHTON, FEAR].
4. ER (NBC 1994-2009).
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Crichton was educated as a doctor, 5 and was comfortable in
the world of science. The general focus of his ceuvre has been
man's hubris in believing that he can control nature through
the use of scientific knowledge. Until State of Fear, the focus
of his numerous books and movies had largely been on
scientists, and science gone amok.6 But in this book, he
turned his attention to how the combination of law, science
and media influence public opinion and policy initiatives on
global warming. What he found there was not to his liking.
Crichton's influence on popular culture and related
political debates is not a trivial matter. For over twenty
years, Crichton's novels and commentary have shaped
American public opinion on topics as diverse as genetic
engineering, sexual harassment, and medical practice.8
Everyone who saw or read Jurassic Park9 imbibed the
dangers of entrepreneurial science. Crichton was helpful to
former President Bush in shaping his message that the
danger of climate change was exaggerated. 1° For a writer of
"thrillers," Crichton, who had also testified before Congress,11
5. See Crichton Biography, http://www.crichton-
official.com/aboutmclbiography.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2006). Crichton posted this
biography at his website: Born in Chicago, Illinois, October 23, 1942. Educated at
Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, A.B. (summa cum laude) 1964 (Phi
Beta Kappa). Henry Russell Shaw Traveling Fellow, 1964-65. Visiting Lecturer in
Anthropology at Cambridge University, England, 1965. Graduated Harvard Medical
School, M.D. 1969; post-doctoral fellow at the Salk Institute for Biological Sciences, La
Jolla, California 1969-1970. Visiting Writer, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
1988; Cf. Crichton Biography, http://www.crichton-official.com/aboutmichaelcrichton-
inmemoriam.html (last visited Aug. 7, 2009) (Crichton died on Nov. 4, 2008); Cf.
Crichton Biography, http://www.crichton-official.comlbooks.html (last visited Aug. 9,
2009). His website is being maintained posthumously, and two books will be published
after this death. State of Fear, however, was his penultimate book during his lifetime.
6. See e.g. MICHAEL CRICHTON, PREY (Harper 2002); MICHAEL CRICHTON,
JURASSIC PARK (Ballantine Books 1990) [herinafter CRICHTON, JURASSIC]; MICHAEL
CRICHTON, THE ANDROMEDA STRAIN (Knopf 1969).
7. See CRICHTON, FEAR, supra note 3, at 572.
8. See supra note 6; See also MICHAEL CRICHTON, DISCLOSURE (Ballantine Books
1994) [herinafter CRICHTON, DISCLOSURE]; ER (NBC 1994-2009); MICHAEL CRICHTON,
FIVE PATIENTS (Arrow Books Ltd 1970).
9. CRICHTON, JURASSIC, supra note 6; JURASSIC PARK (Universal Pictures 1993).
10. Cf. ELIZABETH KOLBERT, FIELD NOTES FROM A CATASTROPHE: MAN, NATURE,
AND CLIMATE CHANGE 197 (Bloomsbury 2006) ("A few weeks later, it was revealed that
the president had turned to Michael Crichton, whose thriller State of Fear portrays
climate change as fiction invented by environmentalists, for advice on how to deal with
the issue. Bush and Crichton reportedly 'talked for an hour and were in near-total
agreement."').
11. See infra note 19.
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had amassed incredible influence as the voice of science and
reason.
Although Crichton had written about lawyers,12 State of
Fear represents his longest exposition, through the characters
of three lawyers, on the effect that lawyers have on science,
science policy, and public opinion. 13 This article focuses on
the claims Crichton makes about lawyers through these
characters. The three lawyers through which he makes his
claim are Peter Evans, an associate at a Los Angeles law firm;
Nicholas Drake, a former litigator now head of National
Environmental Research Fund (NERF); and Richard Kenner,
a man of action who holds both a J.D. and a Ph.D.14
Through these characters, Crichton makes claims about
lawyers, and lawyering. The characters express models of
legal behavior as lawyers mediate the discussions a
democratic society must hold regarding science, policy and
law. First, he claims that lawyers know nothing about
science or the scientific method, nor are they inclined to learn
anything about it. The implication is that, given a lawyer's
central role in policy-making and litigation about science, this
is dangerous to society. In his view, truth is held hostage to
dispute resolution because of the adversary tradition. 15
Second, some public interest organizations, here illustrated
by NERF, have been captured by lawyers to be run as
platforms for pursuing socially disruptive litigation. This use
of lawyers in the novel suggests that matters are pursued,
regardless of its merit, for the sheer enjoyment litigation,
rather than to promote the cause itself.16 Finally, lawyers,
aided by politicians and the media, are complicit in creating
the "state of fear" from which the book takes its title. 17 This
has promoted a "near-hysterical preoccupation with safety,"
12. See CRICHTON, JURASSIC, supra note 6 (The lawyer here is portrayed as a risk
averse character whose job it is to ensure the safe profitability of Jurassic Park.
Although the scene does not appear in the book, most movie goers cheered when the
lawyer was plucked off of a toilet and eaten by a tyrannosaurus rex); See also
CRICHTON, DISCLOSURE, supra note 8 (Male executive retains a lawyer to fight
allegations of sexual harassment).
13. See CRICHTON, FEAR, supra note 3.
14. Jennifer Haynes, a lawyer who infiltrates the NERF litigation staff and is niece
to Kenner, plays a minor role here. Crichton tends not to develop female characters in
his novels, and the same is true here.
15. CRICHTON, FEAR, supra note 3, at 92-93.
16. Id. at 128.
17. Id. at 454-456.
A Few Inconvenient Truths
and the state uses this "fear" to exert social control.18
Crichton does not advance these claims lightly. As a quick
perusal of his website suggests, these claims were his
personal cause. 19 Taking the claims seriously, this essay asks
whether each claim is true; if it is not true, then what is the
correct account, and finally, what should be done after
analyzing these claims. Although made in the guise of a
novel, these claims are taken, and should be taken,
seriously.20 As we have moved from a common-law tradition
to a regulatory state, lawyers' involvement in both the design
of policy and challenges to it has grown exponentially. Many
of these policies are based on scientific findings. Questions
about science and its impact are raised in courts, legislatures
and administrative agencies.21 The quality or soundness of the
relationship between law and science profoundly affects the
legitimacy of the legal enterprise in a knowledge-based
democratic society. This novel raises important issues about
the role of law and lawyers in debates about social policy and
risk in a deliberative democracy.22
18. Id.
19. Crichton had an official website: http://www.crichton-official.com/. He had
given several speeches on this topic: e.g., Michael Crichton, Speech at the Washington
Center for Complexity and Public Policy: Complexity Theory and Environmental
Management (Nov. 6, 2005) (available at http://www.crichton-official.comlspeech-
complexity.html); Michael Crichton, Testimony Before the United States Senate,
Committee on Environment and Public Works (September 28, 2005) (transcript
available at http://www.crichton-official.com/speech-senatetestimony.html); and
Michael Crichton, Speech before the Joint Session AEI-Brookings Institution: Science
Policy in the 21st Century (January 25, 2005) (available at http://www.crichton-
official.com/speech-sciencepolicy.html).
20. State of Fear was widely reviewed, although largely in reference to its claims
about global warming. See, e.g., Michiko Kakutani, Beware! Tree-Huggers Plot Evil to
Save World, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2004, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/13lbooks/l13kaku.html?ex=1159675200&en=6492b2e9
b274af9c&ei=5070. On the other hand, at least one reviewer stated that the book
should be taken seriously: "The whole scenario is outlandish even by Crichtonian
standards, but, when you think about it, there really isn't much choice. What State of
Fear demonstrates is how hard it is to construct a narrative that would actually justify
current American policy. In this way, albeit unintentionally, Crichton has written a
book that deserves to be taken seriously." Elizabeth Kolbert, Getting Warmer, NEW
YORKER, Jan. 3, 2005, at 22.
21. See e.g., ROGER A. PIELKE, THE HONEST BROKER: MAKING SENSE OF SCIENCE IN
POLICY AND POLITICS (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007).
22. See Anthony Chase, Lawyers and Popular Culture: A Review of Mass Media
Portrayals of American Attorneys, 11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 281 (1986) (After noting
that lawyers are "America's preeminently political profession," Chase states: "[Very
little has been written (by lawyers, law professors, or social scientists) on the images
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After outlining the plot of the novel, this article will fully
describe the three claims that Crichton makes about lawyers.
Following each claim will be a response considering whether
the claim accurately describes lawyers and legal practice.
Each response will center on one or two voices in the scholarly
community that have focused on the issues raised by each
claim.23 While there are obviously many other sources of
criticism, my goal here is to expose counterpoints to each of
Crichton's claims.24
I. THE NOVEL
The plot covers a six-month period of time, roughly from
May through October 2004, during which NERF secretly
masterminds a plot to manufacture planetary disasters that
will be attributed to global warming and severe climate
change, thus enhancing NERF's credibility as a cause-based
organization.25 This greater prominence will lead to increased
donations to fund its environmental litigation efforts,
specifically a lawsuit that has been initiated on behalf of
Vanutu, a small Pacific Island that will be inundated as
global warming causes ocean levels to rise.26 A small group of
people foil this plan when they uncover the truth about
NERF's involvement in creating disasters to improve its
image.27 The author uses this plot to discredit current global
warming theories and environmental groups, using footnotes
and charts to supplement the narrative. 28
that Americans have constructed of law and lawyers as mediated through the
institutions of mass culture.").
23. See Part II infra.
24. This essay does not attempt to refute Crichton's views on global warming.
Alternate, and far more accurate, accounts of the problem are available in scientific and
popular literature. See, e.g., Elizabeth Kolbert, The Climate of Man (parts I, II & III),
NEW YORKER, Apr. 25, 2005, at 56, THE NEW YORKER, May 2, 2005, at 64, NEW
YORKER, May 9, 2005, at 52) (These articles were collected into Kolbert's book length
treatment in FIELD NOTES FROM A CATASTROPHE, supra note 10). A summary of the
scientific theory and legal initiatives undertaken appears in Kristin Choo, Feeling the
Heat: The Growing Debate Over Climate Change Takes on Legal Overtones, 92 A.B.A. J.
28 (2006); See also MARK LYNAS, SIX DEGREES: OUR FUTURE ON A HOTTER PLANET
(National Geographic Society 2008) (This book graphically demonstrates the
consequences of global warming at one degree centigrade intervals).
25. CRICHTON, FEAR, supra note 3.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. It is likely that Crichton was fictionalizing the plight of the Pacific Island
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As noted previously, the plot is driven through the actions
of three characters: Peter Evans, Nicolas Drake, and Richard
Kenner. As one reviewer noted, "the characters in this novel
practically come with Post-it notes on their foreheads
indicating whether they are good guys or bad guys."29 Briefly
sketched, twenty-eight year old Peter Evans,30 the every-
lawyer, is a junior associate at the Los Angeles firm of Hassle
and Black, where he apparently exclusively conducts pro bono
litigation in this otherwise corporate firm. Ultimately, he
must choose to align himself with either the "bad" lawyer or
the "good" one. In contrast, Nicholas Drake, the "bad" lawyer,
has been director of NERF for ten years, after retiring from a
"highly successful" career as a litigator.31 Drake is portrayed
as a "drama queen" for whom everything is a crisis, important
and urgent.32  Richard Kenner, the "good" lawyer, is
introduced as a man of action, almost spy-like in his ability to
obtain information and thwart obstacles in his path.33 He has
a J.D. from Harvard, and a Ph.D. in civil engineering from
M.I.T.34 Although obviously the scientific issue driving the
plot, global warming also becomes the stage on which the
three characters make claims not only about the veracity of
global warming, but also about the utility of lawyering.
people of the Carteret Islands, a chain of islands northeast of Papua New Guinea.
"[S]ea levels have risen so much that during the annual king tide season, November to
March, the roiling ocean blocks he view from one island to the next, and residents stash
their possessions in fishing nets strung between the palm trees." Neil MacFarquahr,
Refugees Join List of Climate-Change Issues, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2009, at A4,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/29/world/29refugees.html. Thus,
Crichton's fictionalized dilemma is actually devastatingly real. Island people have
sought a United Nations resolution linking climate change, mass population migration
and national security issues. Typically most climate change debate has been focused on
the science rather than international peace and security issues that arise from mass
population migration and food shortages. The human rights aspect of climate change
was addressed at a The Law of Climate Change and Human Rights Conference: Three
Degrees, the University of Washington School of Law, available at
http://www.threedegreesconference.org/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2009) (which is being
maintained post-conference for further developments.).
29. Kakutani, supra note 20.
30. CRICHTON, FEAR, supra note 3, at 40.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 161.
33. Id. at 31.
34. Id. at 56.
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II. THE CLAIMS ANALYZED
A. Lawyers Willfully Lack knowledge of Science to the
Detriment of Policy-making.
1. The Claim
One of Crichton's claims is that lawyers have no
knowledge of science. In fact, he claims they are proud of
being scientific "know-nothings" who at times, enabled by the
adversary system, willfully distort it.35 Given a lawyer's key
role in shaping science policy, in Crichton's world this is a
grievous sin. He makes this point through the characters of
Peter Evans and Nicholas Drake, and in observations about
the adversary system. This matters because "we're in the
middle of a war - a global war of information versus
disinformation" fought on various battlegrounds: "Newspaper
op-eds. Television reports. Scientific journals. Websites,
conferences, classrooms - and courtrooms, too, if it comes to
that."36
From the beginning, lawyers are portrayed as people who,
in contrast to scientists, use facts instrumentally. This is
illustrated in an exchange between Drake and a scientist,
witnessed by Evans, whose work has been sponsored by
NERF.37 The scientist's data shows that Iceland has become
colder, and its glaciers have been advancing. 38 Drake tries to
persuade the scientist to change the explanation of the data
in a way that the scientist feels "twists truth."39 Drake insists
that the corporate disinformation campaigns will seize upon
this fact to the implied detriment of environmental groups.
The scientist replies, "[h]ow the information is used is not my
concern. My concern is to report the truth as best I can."
35. Id. at 44, 94,187.
36. Id. at 48.
37. Id. at 23.
38. Id. at 43. A footnote at the bottom of the page accompanies the character
dialogue: "P. Chylek, et al. 2004, 'Global warming and the Greenland ice sheet,'
Climatic Change 63, 201-21. 'Since 1940 . . . data have undergone predominantly a
cooling trend .... The Greenland ice sheet and coastal regions are not following the
current global warming trend."' At the very beginning of the novel, Crichton has placed
a note that states: "This is a work of fiction .... However, references to real people,
institutions, and organizations that are documented in footnotes are accurate.
Footnotes are real." Id. at vii.
39. Id.
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"'Very noble,' Drake said. 'Perhaps not so practical."'4 °
Peter Evans later confirms that lawyers have this view of
truth and truth telling. When discussing the likelihood of
opposing scientific evidence in the Vanutu case, Evans
reflects that "[o]ne of the first things you learned in law school
was that the law was not about truth. It was about dispute
resolution. In the course of resolving a dispute, the truth
might or might not emerge. Often it did not.... It happened
all the time."41 This likely leads to Crichton's conclusion, in
his "Author's Note," that complex system management and
policy-making should not be done through litigation, but
rather through the political process. 42
But even more appalling for Crichton is the typical
lawyer's lack of, if not outright disdain for, scientific
knowledge. Principally through Evans, and to a lesser extent
Drake, the novel is a virtual acid rain of a lawyer's contempt
for scientific knowledge. From the beginning, Evans is so
scientifically inept that he does not understand why NERF is
funding so many scientific experts for the Vanutu case until
Jennifer Haynes, one of the NERF Vanutu litigators, points
out that the focus on data is central to the litigation "because
we're trying to win the case."43 Evans needed to be reminded
that in the adversary system, data can be used
instrumentally to persuade the fact finder of the "truth" of the
legal claim in order to win at trial.
On numerous occasions, Evans is depicted as willfully
ignorant of science. Although responsible for assessing the
Vanutu litigation for his client, George Morton, Evans does
not understand the sea level measurement formula crucial to
the litigation.44  Later, Evans, an environmental lawyer,
admits that he is "clueless" about science and that the
complexity of it gives him a headache. 45 As he falls under the
influence of Kenner, Kenner must take pains to explain
simple science ideas to Evans such as the notion of a standing
40. Id. at 44.
41. Id. at 92-93.
42. Seeld. at 572.
43. Id. at 79.
44. Id. at 95.
45. Id. at 187-188. This is in contrast to most environmental lawyers in my
acquaintance, many of whom have become knowledgeable about the scientific basis of
global warming and other environmental problems.
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wave, or the significance of error terms in scientific research.46
As Crichton concludes, when Evans narrowly saves himself
from a lightning strike, "[h]e didn't know any science, but
assumed it must be something metallic or electronic. 47 Evans
is similarly unable to distinguish between good science and
bad science, and therefore is not troubled by the anomalies
between different data sets and their implications for
litigation or other legal pursuits.48 Ultimately, however,
under the careful and patient tutelage of Kenner, Evans is
redeemed and comes to appreciate science. 49
Drake, one of the founding heads of NERF, is equally
bereft of scientific knowledge: "[H]e had no science
background at all."50 Crichton's message is that this lack of
background, combined with the norms of the adversary
tradition, means that lawyers have absolutely no scruples
about distorting scientific truth.
2. Another View
On this claim, Crichton does have a valid point. Many
lawyers are woefully ignorant of science, statistics and the
methods of each discipline. This can be especially
46. Id. at 210, 247; See also id. at 248, 313, 406. There is also a subtextual
argument that lawyers' indifference to science and their commitment to orderly dispute
resolution make them wimps. Kenner chides Evans on several occasions for being
afraid to use physical force. He chides Evans for being reluctant about fighting back,
and Evans replies, "[m]aybe so, but I'm a lawyer." Id. at 261. Later, Evans thinks,
"[j]ust because I don't shoot guns... I'm a lawyer, for Christ's sake." Id. at 323. Under
the tutelage of Kenner on both science and manliness, Evans overcomes his reluctance
to resort to violence, and is then seen as more confident, older, and more mature,
particularly by the women around him. Id. at 357-359. This also underscores a
message that Crichton is trying to make about civilization versus the state of nature.
Nature is not something admirable in Crichton's view; rather, civilization saves us from
nature be it cannibals or rampaging dinosaurs or tiny microbes. Id. at 527. "You think
civilization is some horrible, polluting human invention that separates us from the
state of nature. But civilization doesn't separate us from nature, Ted. Civilization
protects us from nature. Because what you see right now, all around you [cannibals]-
this is nature." Id.
47. Id. at 336.
48. See id. at 84-90, 247-248.
49. For example, Kenner patiently provides Evans with references on global
warming in a successful effort to "turn" him to the anti-global warming side. Id. at 193
(It is through this device that Crichton is able to introduce a number of charts, studies
and footnotes into the plotline).
50. Id. at 127.
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troublesome because "[s]cience provides many of the
assumptions that underlie most environmental laws and is
frequently used by policy-makers to justify decision-making.
Often, science is used support various claims, counter-claims
and assumptions about the environment.51
This is paradoxical because, since the time of Christopher
Columbus Langdell, the father of the modern law school
curriculum, and the formalists, law has attempted to ground
itself in science and to imitate it:
[A]ll the available materials of that science [that is, law] are
contained in printed books... [T]he library is ... to us all that the
laboratories of the university are to the chemists and physicists, all
that the museum of natural history is to the zoologists ..... 52
For these early legal theorists, hitching law's star to the
scientific wagon was a way to argue for the logic and
endurance of law. For law, a discipline that meddles so much
in human affairs, it was a way to suggest some certainty and
objectivity in its pronouncements. The law school became the
center of legal research, which went hand-in-hand with the
development of legal elites. 53 Although the focus of law has
shifted to the social sciences, this attraction to scientific
method has been a way in which law tries to assure its critics
of its rationality and objectivity. It is also a way of assuring
that the predictions law must make, and the control that it
has over human behavior, has some basis in reality.
In his implicit critique, Crichton raises two objections.
The first is that lawyers know little about science; the second
is that, because the adversary system focuses more on dispute
resolution than on truth, it does not partner well with science.
Many lawyers do have a limited grounding in science,
although there have been no empirical studies to confirm this.
Professor Faigman, in his book Legal Alchemy: The Use and
Misuse of Science in the Law,54 depicts lawyers and scientists
as speaking two different languages. He is an especially
harsh critic of lawyers, noting that "[m]any students who
51. John McEldowney, The Environment, Science, and Law, in 1 LAW AND
SCIENCE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 109 (Helen Reece, ed., 1998).
52. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OFAMERICAN LAW 42 (Yale Univ. Press 1977).
53. See, e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE, ch. 3 (Oxford University
Press 1976); GILMORE, supra note 52, at ch. 3.
54. DAVID FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN LAW
(W.H. Freeman and Company 2000) [hereinafter LEGAL ALCHEMY].
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have spent much of their educational life avoiding math and
science become lawyers. . . The average lawyer is not merely
ignorant of science, he or she has an affirmative aversion toit."55
As Faigman chronicles, while law and science (and
religion), began as intellectual partners, with a concomitant
admixture of the natural and the moral, their ways departed.
In the course of his book, he makes two basic points about law
and science, both of which are germane to Crichton's
exposition. First, Faigman pointedly paints lawyers as
woefully ignorant of science and develops the ways in which
this ignorance affects the three venues where law and science
intersect: the courtroom, the legislature, and administrative
agencies. 56 For example, he points out that the Supreme
Court's "insecurity" in grappling with science has "real costs"
that cause the justices to avoid "need analysis" because of its
lack of comfort with science57 Although the Court finally
erected legal rules for the use of expert and scientific
testimony in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,58
Faigman noted that many continue to doubt the ability of
jurists as scientific gatekeepers. However, he believes that
most judges have the intellectual capacity to master the
science that is presented in court proceedings.5 9 His goal is
not to turn lawyers into scientists, but into "good consumers
of science," noting that lawyers should have the ability "to
read research reports written by scientists."60
55. Id. at xi.
56. Id. at 49.
57. Id. at 26.
58. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). In that case, the underlying substantive issue involved
whether the maternal ingestion of the anti-nausea drug, Bendictin, caused birth
defects. The Court announced that the trial court judge must assure that admitted
scientific "evidence is not only relevant, but reliable." Thus, judges are now tasked with
the task of determining "whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific
knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand of determine a fact in issue.
This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. We are confident that federal
judges possess the capacity to under this review." Id. at 592-93. In their eyes, then,
"good" or legally relevant science will be testable, ordinarily peer reviewed, have an
ascertainable error rate, and find general acceptance in the scientific community. Id. at
593-95.
59. LEGAL ALCHEMY, supra note 54, at 64.
60. Id. at 199. In fact, he ultimately suggests that this may be a constitutionally
imposed duty: 'The Constitution imparts an affirmative obligation on lawmakers to act
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That said, Faigman is also very clear that scientific
outcomes should not determine the underlying value, legal or
policy decisions; in fact the opposite is true. He is clear that
law, for principled reasons, might choose to ignore scientific
principles in setting policy, 61 but that would be, presumably,
only after understanding the science and its applicability to
the issue at hand. This is because the disciplines of law and
science have two different tasks: science studies what is; law,
what ought to be 62 (although this is not to say that the tasks
are unrelated).63
B. Cause-Lawyering is Dangerous to the Policy-making and
Political Process.
1. The Claim
It is bad enough in Crichton's view that lawyers are
cheerfully ignorant of science, but when this ignorance is
married to public interest group litigation and pro bono
lawyering, it becomes dangerous. Through the characters of
Drake and Evans, Crichton claims that public interest
lawyering64 is, for all intents and purposes, not in the public
interest. He views environmental organizations as shells or
covers for litigators to play out policy dramas that would be
better resolved by scientists and Congress.
Most of Crichton's ire is aimed at litigation-driven public
interest organizations, and the epitome of the form is
captured in the character of Nicolas Drake, an ill-informed
and self-aggrandizing character. Drake, formerly a successful
litigator, left active practice to become the director of NERF, a
position that he held for ten years. 65 The organization Drake
directs represents the island of Vanutu in the global warming
rationally in carrying out their public duties. This means necessarily that they should
have some facility with science and the scientific method." Id. at 202.
61. Id. at 11.
62. Id. at 6.
63. He describes law as operating in the world of policy, but it needs to know facts,
established by science, in order to operate in that world of policy. Id. at 26.
64. Crichton does not attach a particular conceptual label to the environmental
lawyers he depicts in his book. In this paper, the term "cause lawyering," rather than
public interest advocacy/lawyering, will be used to describe this form of legal practice
and advocacy.
65. CRICHTON, FEAR, supra note 3, at 40.
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litigation that is a centerpiece of the plot.66 While the lawsuit
itself is ostensibly important to Drake, he is also concerned
that it generate publicity. In fact, the publicity surrounding
the lawsuit becomes more important than the suit itself.67
Crichton's condemnation of this model of cause lawyering
comes to a head when a disenchanted supporter condemns the
organization and the litigation, concluding that the money
would be better spent on research:
I said before that we don't know enough. But I fear that today, the
watchword of NERF has become, we don't sue enough.... NERF is
a law firm. I don't know if you realize that. It was started by
lawyers and it is run by lawyers. But I now believe money is better
spent on research than litigation. And that is why I'm withdrawing
[my funding of the Vanutu lawsuit].68
Drake is outraged by this loss of support, noting that
industry, NERF's opponent, is incredibly strong and "will stop
at nothing" to see that the lawsuit is foiled.69 In fact, it seems
that the only thing that drives Drake is funding. Causes are
nothing more to the character than a means of obtaining
funds.70
In this portrayal of cause lawyering, everything is
subordinate to funding and publicity. The lawyer appears to
direct the setting of priorities, the choice of strategy, and is
the "brains" behind the operation. That Drake is the
originator of the highly illegal idea of causing severe climate
change incidents to generate publicity and funding is
consistent with the portrait of the character: a selfish, flighty
person who has put litigation and publicity before any deep
scientific understanding of the complexities of the underlying
issue.
The portrait of Peter Evans as a cause-lawyer is only
66. As Crichton notes, this litigation "was never filed." Id. at xi. The story is thus
framed as an explanation of this failed piece of environmental litigation, somewhat in
the form of an expos6.
67. Id. at 52, 392 ("You know as well as I do that the whole purpose of this case was
to generate publicity They've got their press conference There's no need to pursue it
further."). Crichton also suggests that environmental groups funnel funds to
ecoterrorists. Id. at 182, 560 (that claim, however, is beyond the scope of this paper).
68. Id. at 129.
69. Id. at 159.
70. Drake argues that global warming does not scare people enough to generate
donations the way that cancer-causing pollution can. He needs a cause "that works!"
where works is measured by the amount of funds generated. Id. at 295-96.
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slightly more sympathetic. Perhaps this is because Evans
eventually "sees the light" and backs away from NERF and
the Vanutu lawsuit while helping Kenner to foil Drake's plan
of intentionally causing severe climate incidents. Here, the
sketch is less developed but Evans is drawn as someone who
pursues cause lawyering at a major Los Angeles law firm
described as "forward-looking, socially aware."71 While his
firm represents celebrities with environmental concerns, it
also represents the three biggest land developers in Orange
County.72 Evans's sole responsibility, however, is to represent
George Morton and his environmental interests.7 3 As noted
above, Evans is a cause-lawyer with absolutely no background
knowledge in the science that forms the basis of the
environmental and global warming concerns of his client base.
Kenner berates Evans for his firm's client arrangements,
accusing Evans of being a flunky for the environmental
movement because environmental clients pay his salary and
thus control his personal opinions. When Evans objects to
this characterization, Crichton, through the character of
Kenner, replies, "[n]ow you know how legitimate scientists
feel when their integrity is impugned by slimy
characterizations such as the one you just made" (where
Evans suggested studies were biased by the industry paying
for them).74
In summary, cause-lawyering in this portrait is
manipulative as well as instrumental. In addition to self-
aggrandizement, the lawyers are driven by a pre-occupation
with money and the publicity it can buy. Lawsuits are filed
only because they can generate publicity, not because they
may actually address and remedy real social problems.
Because of these barely hidden ulterior motives, cause
lawyering and the resultant lawsuits, even if not pursued, are
dangerous for making sound social and scientific policy. This
is especially the case because lawyers are part of the "PLM,"
or political-legal-media complex, that intentionally creates
fear in the subject population7 5 Crichton, in his final author's
71. Id. at 71.
72. Id.. This configuration of clients seems unlikely given professional conflict of
interest rules.
73. Id..
74. Id. at 195-96.
75. Id. at 456.
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note, states: "We need more scientists and many fewer
lawyers. We cannot hope to manage a complex system such as
the environment through litigation."76
2. Another View
Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold shine light on a far
more nuanced view of cause lawyering. 77 Although this type
of practice has not received much scholarly attention,78 their
body of work has been important in defining and describing
exactly what cause lawyering is, how it emerged historically,
and the role it plays in practice and in deliberative
democracies. As portrayed by these authors and their
contributors to the edited volumes, cause lawyers attempt to
eliminate the tension between personal values and beliefs,
and the value systems of their clients. In short, they reject
the "hired gun" stereotype of the lawyer.79 As depicted in the
scholarly literature, Crichton's portrait of environmental
lawyers is deeply flawed. He has the analysis backwards: the
lawyers do not drive the cause; rather, the cause drives the
lawyers.
From the three works of Austin Sarat and Stuart
Scheingold, a definition of the cause lawyer emerges that is
both rich and complex. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, in her
contribution, faces head-on the question that Crichton never
raises: "Is the environmental defense lawyer in the U.S.
76. Id. at 572. Crichton believes that "resolution of conflicting claims" should be
resolved through the political system. Id.
77. See e.g., AUSTIN SARAT & STUART SCHEINGOLD, CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (Oxford University Press 1998)
[hereinafter CAUSE LAWYERING]; AUSTIN SARAT & STUART SCHEINGOLD, SOMETHING TO
BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING (Stanford University
Press 2004) [hereinafter SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN]; AUSTIN SARAT & STUART
SCHEINGOLD, THE WORLDS CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE: STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN LEGAL
PRACTICE (Stanford University Press 2005) [hereinafter WORLDS]; A fourth and later
book, THE CULTURAL LIVES OF CAUSE LAWYERS, focuses on depictions of various
lawsuits and lawyers in the media. AUSTIN SARAT & STUART SCHEINGOLD, THE
CULTURAL LIVES OF CAUSE LAWYERS (Cambridge Univ. Press 2008).
78. CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 77, at 38, 41, 45. Similarly, in SOMETHING TO
BELIEVE IN, the authors note that, because of the lack of scholarship, there is not a
single valid definition. SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN, supra note 77, at 3. They borrow,
however, a definition proposed by David Luban, and state: "At its core, cause lawyering
is about using legal skills to pursue ends and ideals that transcend client service-be
those ideals social, cultural, political, economic or, indeed, legal." Id.
79. CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 77, at 3.
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Department of Justice politically and morally equivalent to
the environmental prosecutor in the same agency, much less
lawyers representing the Sierra Club?"80 What exactly, then,
is a "cause lawyer"?
For Menkel-Meadow, cause lawyering is "any activity that
seeks to use law-related means or seeks to change laws or
regulations to achieve greater social justice-both for
particular individuals (drawing on individualistic 'helping'
orientations) and for disadvantaged groups."81 She concludes,
"the goals and the purposes of the legal actor are to 'do good' -
to seek a more just world - to do 'lawyering for the good."'8 2
Sarat and Scheingold, while not disagreeing with Menkel-
Meadow, develop the definition further. They also see cause-
lawyers as "political actors," albeit actors "whose work
involves doing law."83 While cause lawyering does not
"preclude mixed motives," Sarat and Scheingold note that
"political or moral commitment [is] an essential and
distinguishing feature of cause lawyering."84 Because cause-
lawyers exist in a number of practice settings with varying
levels of commitment, they are arrayed along a continuum
that moves from something more than a conventional client-
servicing lawyer to a political activist, who, while law-trained,
may no longer actively practice law.85 The authors note that
the distinguishing factor of this type of practice may be the
way in which law is reconnected to morality, and that the
lawyer "shares and aims to share with her client
responsibility for the ends she is promoting in her
representation."86
80. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: Toward an
Understanding of the Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice Lawyers," in CAUSE
LAWYERING, supra note 77, at 33; See also id. at 55 fn. 20 (for the list of sources she
compiles).
81. Id. at 37.
82. Id.
83. Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and Conventional
Lawyering: Professional and Political Perspectives, in SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN, supra
note 77, at 3.
84. Id. at 4. On the next page, they note that cause lawyering is often called public
interest lawyering but they reject this label because cause lawyering is "more inclusive"
and does not implicitly distinguish between "worthy and unworthy causes" nor is it
necessarily associated with a reform agenda in a liberal political sense. Id. at 5.
85. CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 77, at 7.
86. Id. at 3. Continuing, they note that this raises problems for traditional notions
of professional responsibility, and that the attention to altering some facet of the status
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While attempting to change political relations, cause
lawyering is in fact bounded by politics. In their earliest
work, Sarat and Scheingold observe that cause lawyering is
affected by the type of political regime as well as "by the
prevailing legal tradition."87 In a system where law is
autonomous, the combination of law and politics threatens the
relationship between the two disciplines. This combination
suggests that, borrowing from E.P. Thompson, law is
derivative of politics and is an "arena of struggle" in which
law challenges the dominant politics and culture.88 Menkel-
Meadow echoes this observation, noting that the organization
of the state "affects how cause lawyering is expressed"
because legal rules define the permissible area and types of
challenges to the system.8 9 This operation within and on the
edges of the political community may historically be a
dominant feature of cause lawyering. As Menkel-Meadow
states:
The modern cause lawyer, then, is not unlike the lawyer of the
'mediating' class described by Tocqueville in the nineteenth
century. In addition to translating between classes, the cause
lawyer seeks to work within the system, to use the law, either to
change it or to hold it to its promises, but retaining a more abstract
commitment to its symbols, regimes, and rules beyond the relief of
individual pain.90
In another study in Cause Lawyering, Professors McCann
and Silverstein, after reviewing the classic portrait of the self-
interested, hired-gun lawyer, state that their "research has
not confirmed the standard critical view of legal activists" but
rather has revealed that "although cause lawyers in our study
certainly did encourage the use of tactics associated with the
quo "transforms" the lawyer-client relationship so that "[s]erving the client is but one
component of serving the cause," thus moving moral questions to the center of the
relationship in contrast to the traditional model. Id. at 4. They reiterate this point in
their article, The Dynamics of Cause Lawyering: Constraints and Opportunities, in
WORLDS, supra note 77, at 1-3 (noting distinctiveness of this style of practice,
encompassing lawyers who may work for a single cause or are "less closely identified
with any cause...," this form of practice reconnects law and morality, and makes
apparent that law is a "public profession.").
87. CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 77, at 7.
88. Id. at 8-9. This is not surprising since they assert that in common law
traditions, the boundaries between 'law and politics tend to be readily permeable" with
lawyers moving between different types of practice. Id. at 6.
89. Id. at 35.
90. Id. at 47.
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judicial system, they tended to be highly circumspect, critical,
and strategically sophisticated about the pitfalls of legal
action, the 'liberal' biases of legal norms, and the imperatives
of effective political struggle."'91 They concluded, "[a]ll in all,
legal victories were hardly seen as ends in themselves by the
lawyers we studied," and that all of the studied lawyers
"noted the ethical code of conduct that must be adhered to in
avoiding 'frivolous suits."'92
Finally, Sarat and Scheingold have mapped the three
practice settings inhabited by cause-lawyers. Chapter four of
their study, Something to Believe In, finds that most cause-
lawyers (a) work in the pro bono practice of a corporate law
firm, (b) are salaried lawyers working for a public agency or
privately-funded advocacy organization, or (c) work in a small
firm setting devoted to cause lawyering. 93 The type of
organization in which cause-lawyers practice can affect their
level of commitment, resources, and the strategies they
employ.
In the corporate setting, where Peter Evans practices, the
major advantage for the cause-lawyer is the resources at the
lawyer's disposal, such as billable hour requirements.
However, these are limited by a firm's major function,
servicing corporate clients, which entails adhering to
professional responsibility rules regulating conflicts of
interest. Positional conflicts (where a pro bono client has an
interest at odds with the perceived interests of paying,
corporate clients) particularly act to constrain firm advocacy
because a firm's primary allegiance is to its corporate clients.
Although this limits the ability of someone practicing in this
venue to truly "upset the apple cart," the authors conclude
corporate practice is a valid and widely employed vehicle for
legal activism9 4
Salaried staff lawyers and lawyers in firms devoted to
91. Id. at 266.
92. Id. at 269, 271. They add that most cause lawyers did not pursue litigation
that had little chance of success because of the actual costs to the movements in which
they were involved. Id. at 271.
93. SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN, supra note 77, at 72-95. For a sustained example
of cause lawyers operating in a case that involved science, see Margaret Talbot, Darwin
in the Dock: Intelligent Design has its Day in Court, NEW YORKER, Dec. 5, 2005, at 66.
This article is also interesting because it depicts "right-wing" cause lawyers, a breed of
political/legal activist that has only recently emerged.
94. SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN, supra note 77, at 74-80.
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cause advocacy have many more avenues to pursue their
agendas of change. Lawyers working on the staff of an
organization typically must subsume their personal goals to
the organizational mission, and the typically lower salaries
are a trade off from the "commodified legal services" that are
more typical in corporate practice9 5 Cause-oriented small
firms represent a collegial option where a lawyer can practice
with like-minded individuals and may have more freedom of
choice in clients and methods to pursue their goals. 96 The
pressure on this freedom, however, is the need to generate
enough fee-based business to support the practice.9 7
Regardless of the practice setting, all of the Sarat and
Scheingold research discussed above supports the finding that
cause-lawyers do not engage in frivolous litigation, nor do
they use litigation manipulatively for their own ends.
Litigation is in the service of the cause; the cause is not in the
service of litigation. Although some cause-lawyers engage
politically, other lawyers do engage in "rule-of-law" cause-
lawyering which means giving priority to using the courts and
litigation to achieve their objectives. That is, for the legally
engaged cause-lawyer, "legality is, in effect, the cause." 8
What differs in this setting is that the legal system is used
more creatively and in more sophisticated ways than is
conventionally assumed.99 The McCann and Silverstein study
of lawyers involved in pay equity and animal rights issues
found that, in contrast to the traditional view, nearly all of
the attorneys considered "law, litigation, and legal tactics in a
skeptical, politically sophisticated manner.100 Legal tactics
may be used appropriately only in certain situations:
For most of our subjects, these "right" uses involved careful
coordination of litigation and legal advocacy with other tactics and
resources.... In particular, most of our lawyers discussed the ways
95. Id. at 80-87.
96. Id. at 89.
97. Id. at 87-94.
98. Id. at 18-19.
99. Michael McCann & Helena Silverstein, Rethinking Law's 'Allurements"- A
Relational Analysis of Social Movement Lawyers in the United States, in CAUSE
LAWYERING, supra note 77, at 262. They state that the traditional critique of lawyers
assumes that lawyers favor litigation as a preferred means of change and have an
overly optimistic view of law's transformative power, and are seen as motivated by
glory, status and prestige. Id. This claim is not borne out by their study. Id. at 261-86.
100. Id. at 266 (emphasis in original).
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in which litigation could be effectively used to bolster efforts for
constituent education and mobilization, political lobbying,
negotiation with management, and winning allied support. ' 0 1
They conclude: "[L]egal victories were hardly seen as ends
in themselves .. ,"102 The lawyers were constantly aware of
the ethical constraints on litigation, its many costs, and the
advantages of other means of dispute resolution.103 Most
surprisingly, in contrast to Crichton's claim that cause-
lawyers "take over" a movement, McCann and Silverstein
found the opposite: "[C]ause lawyers did not tend to dominate
movements or clients, nor did they ignore rank and file
movement leaders."14 In part, the clients' suspicions kept
this in check and also, the lawyers themselves understood
that they were part of a group, rather than acting
independently, and needed to work toward connecting with
clients.105 McCann and Silverstein conclude, "[t]hus, the
stereotype of the overly litigious lawyer may be just that: a
stereotype." 106 Notably, although Crichton and much of
popular culture malign lawyers, the social science literature
paints a different portrait, particularly of cause-lawyers.1°7
C. Lawyers, Allied with Media and Politicians, Are Complicit
in Creating a "State of Fear" Which Makes Intelligent
Policy Planning in a Deliberative Democracy Impossible.
1. The Claim
Many techno-thrillers have at their heart some kind of
conspiracy that creates an "us versus them" flavor, and State
of Fear is no different. It is perhaps better, however, to let
Crichton directly state his claim that "social control is best
101. Id.
102. Id. at 269.
103. Id. at 269-71.
104. Id. at 274
105. Id. at 274-76.
106. Id. at 277; See also WORLDS, supra note 77, at 10-13.
107. See e.g., Chase, supra note 22, at 281 (observing that "very little has been
written (by lawyers, law professors, or social scientists) on the images that Americans
have constructed of law and lawyers as mediated through the institutions of mass
culture."). His sketch reveals that there are two predominant images: the good,
virtuous lawyer (think Atticus Finch), versus the negative, power and money hungry
lawyer.
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managed through fear[,]"1s as he does through the character
of Professor Norman Hoffman, who studies the ecology of
thought in a dialogue with Peter Evans. Beginning with the
premise that every sovereign needs to control the behavior of
its citizens, Hoffman describes the state of fear induced by the
environmental crises that now takes the place of the Cold
War:
But the military-industrial complex is no longer the primary driver
of society. In reality, for the last fifteen years we have been under
the control of an entirely new complex, far more powerful and far
more pervasive. I call it the politico-legal-media complex. The
PLM. And it is dedicated to promoting fear in the population-
under the guise of promoting safety. [Although Evans
acknowledges the role of safety, and Hoffman acknowledges
Western nations are "fabulously safe" he continues.] Yet people do
not feel they are, because of the PLM. And the PLM is powerful
and stable, precisely because it unites so many institutions of
society. Politicians need fears to control the population. Lawyers
need dangers to litigate, and make money. The media need scare
stories to capture an audience. Together, these three estates are so
compelling that they can go about their business even if the scare is
totally groundless. If it has no basis in fact at all... this is the way
modern society works-by the constant creation of fear. And there
is no countervailing force. There is no system of checks and
balances, no restraint on the perpetual promotion of fear after fear
after fear .... 109
Even after Evans weakly asserts that the freedom of
speech and of the press may act as limitations, Hoffman
continues:
We are talking about a situation that is profoundly immoral. It is
disgusting, if truth be told. The PLM callously ignores the plight of
the poorest and most desperate human beings on our planet in
order to keep fat politicians in office, rich news anchors on the air,
and conniving lawyers in Mercedes-Benz convertibles. Oh, and
university professors in Volvos. Let's not forget them. 110
Thus, it is not surprising a few pages later when the media
display of a speech at a NERF climate conference is
108. CRICHTON, FEAR, supra note 3, at 454.
109. Id. at 456.
110. Id. at 454-57. Crichton states in his author's note: 'The current near-hysterical
preoccupation with safety is at best a waste of resources and a crimp on the human
spirit, and at worst an invitation to totalitarianism. Public education is desperately
needed." Id. at 571.
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mysteriously changed in anticipation of NERF's evil plot to
create artificial climate disasters.11l
2. Another View
It is easy to dismiss Crichton's construction of the Politico-
legal-media complex or PLM as little more than a plot device,
but under closer scrutiny, it becomes apparent that it is
actually an extended case of lawyer-bashing. While a social
scientist might be quick to point out the outmoded views of
politics and culture on which his PLM model rests, the focus
here will be on whether Crichton correctly points the finger at
lawyers as the agents creating litigiousness and a society in
which people measure behavior in units of fear.
As explained by Professors Michael McCann and William
Haltom, knowledge about the legal system can be socially
constructed. As they note in their introduction, "We are
interested in how legal knowledge, and hence law itself, is
constructed and produced in mass-mediated culture." 112
Viewed through the perspective of their works, State of Fear
reveals itself as little more than an extended "tort tale" which
is part of an American narrative tradition that "convey[s]
serious meaning and exercise[s] pervasive interpretive power
in modern American society .... These narratives, we argue,
are one important component in a powerful tradition of legal
lore permeating contemporary mass culture."11 Nor are these
"tort tales" harmless anecdotes or amusing jokes: "[T]hese
pervasive allegations about civil law are but one dimension of
a larger assault on rights entitlements, legal challenges to
hierarchy, and democratic appeals to courts that have fueled
the culture wars in American society over the past several
decades."14
111. Id. at 462-64.
112. WILLIAM HALTOM AND MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS,
MEDIA AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS ix (University of Chicago Press 2004) [hereinafter
DISTORTING THE LAW].
113. Id. at 5-6. This is not necessarily a new or original portrait of lawyers. See, e.g.,
Donald Baker, The Lawyer in Popular Fiction, 3 J. POPULAR CULTURE 493, 502 (1969)
(noting that "[d]uring the depression era, novelists [depicted] the lawyer... as engaged
in a conspiracy with business and property owners to exploit those less fortunate in
American society. The heroes of these novels, certain that they are being cheated and
robbed by this combination, condemn both the law and lawyers.").
114. See e.g., DISTORTING THE LAW, supra note 112, at 6 n. 10 (defining "culture
war" as "competing visions of the proper relationship between individual responsibility
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"Tort tales," as they are later defined are "moralistic
parables that refocus general dissatisfaction with civil justice
into particular outrages or injustices" and have powerful
ideological consequences in the values that they convey and
shape.115 The salient features of "tort tales" that make them
successful in shaping legal knowledge are their elegance,
stereotypic characterizations of legal actors and behaviors,
and the "holler of the dollar." i.e. the price that immoral
litigants can exact from society.116 These stories derive their
power from the fact that they are widely available,
understandable, memorable, and ultimately uplifting. 117
This account explains why Crichton's story, even while
ponderous, nonetheless is calculated to appeal to American
sensibilities. The stereotypic visions he paints of lawyers,
embroiling them in a conspiracy to defraud the American
people, is one that resonates with much of the prevailing
anecdotal and political discourse. Yet, Part B of this article
demonstrates that the opposite is true. As sketched in that
section, cause lawyers are servants of causes rather than
drivers of agendas. An extensive body of social science
research, reviewed by Haltom and McCann, points out that in
"the disputing framework," and "[d]espite complaints about
the role of lawyers in Modern American society, lawyers act
as gatekeepers who restrict the flow of cases and discourage
and the collective 'moral community,"' and locate "education, television, movies,
newspapers, advertising, etc. as the primary sites of this contest for influence" which
has permeated our official political discourse.).
115. Id. at 61.
116. Id. at 62. By this characterization, Drake is the classic immoral litigator.
117. Id. at 68-70. Ironically, Haltom and McCann point out the failure of scholarly
accounts or rebuttals (such as this one) to rebut tort tales because they are not
published in accessible journals, generally require specialized knowledge to be
understandable, and because of the demands in professional culture, must be balanced
and impartial. Id. at 73-75, 100-09. As they conclude:
If we are correct that the reformers' assault on excessive litigation represents
a moral crusade as much or more than an empirical challenge, then normative
arguments about justice, democracy, and social responsibility define the
terrain on which the primary political battle must be waged. Scholarly
dismissals of the "politics of ideas" - as if this politics were somehow impure or
dishonest -retreats from the challenge of demonstrating how individualistic
moral frames obscure key issues, how such frames displace concerns about
power, how norms of responsibility might be applied differently, and a host of
other possible challenges to neoliberal and neoconservative values.
Id. at 108.
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some litigation.11S This research demonstrates compellingly
that most accounts of disputing overlook the role of lawyers as
winnowers of litigation and, by focusing on trials and other
highly publicized legal events, miss the invisible data about
grievances that are resolved by other forms of dispute
resolution.119 With respect to "tort tales," even lawyers tend
not to rebut the depiction of their role or of their cases in the
popular press. As Haltom and McCann note, a lawyer's ability
to tell "powerful stories" about tort or any other form of
litigation is constrained by professional ethics and law.120
Thus, contrary to Crichton's assertions, the relative
inaccessibility of empirically accurate information about the
operation of the legal system, as well as professional and legal
constraints against divulging client stories, ultimately leaves
lawyers at the mercy of the media rather than in collusion
with them. This is exacerbated by the institutional
tendencies of news organizations to gloss over the technical
aspects of legal stories, and failure to follow cases beyond
initial filing in the level of detail that would expose the
nuances of litigation.121 These popular stories, in turn, make
it easy to believe the worst about lawyers. The stigma
attached to lawyers and their use of the legal system
developed as a result of these stories' effect on "other rights
based movements" like the environmental movement, and
diminished the legal system's clout in the political arena. 22
118. Id. at 80 (drawing heavily on Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of
Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) about Our Allegedly
Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983)).
119. DISTORTING THE LAW, supra note 112, at 80. Additionally, it is now widely
accepted that the trial plays a greatly reduced role in dispute resolution.
120. Id. at 129. Their general account of the American Trial Lawyers Association's
reluctance to take on tort tales is told in Chapter 4 of their book. Much of this
hesitancy arises from the fact that to fully "tell" the story will require divulging client
confidences, which is a violation of the professional responsibility rules that prevail in
most states.
121. In Chapters 5 through 8, Haltom and McCann chronicle the lapses in media
coverage of legal events, and in fact, how the media have been "captured" by purveyors
of "tort tales." For example, they describe how "pop tort reformers", who often have a
better understanding of how media coverage works, inject "tort tales" into media
coverage. Id. at 150. Similarly, they undertake an empirical study to understand how
civil litigation is (mis)reported in the popular press, partially due to the efforts of tort
reformers but also because of the institutional limitations of news coverage. Id. at 155-
74. Chapter 6 of their account is a detailed, truthful account of the McDonalds "hot
coffee" litigation.
122. Id. at 288.
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In the end, "prevailing commonsense lore about the lawsuit
crisis has impeded sophisticated discourse about the
complexities of tort law practice, about the most important
recent developments in those practices, about alternative
modes of productive legal reform, and about a wide array of
socially responsible, just, and effective policy options for
dealing with risks of harm experienced by citizens.123
CONCLUSION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN
AN AGE OF FEAR
Crichton's book touches a raw nerve in the American
psyche. Everywhere one looks, Americans are experiencing
"fear" of something - terrorism, global warming, rising crime.
"Fear Itself' has appeared as a character in the cartoon
Doonesbury24, and the Washington Post National Weekly
Edition ran an article titled "Fraidy Cat Nation: The Only
Thing We Have to Fear is the Hype Over Fear Itself."125
While the headlines may seem new, there is nothing
particularly new about dealing with the unknown, the
uncertain, and the frightening in literature and fiction. Our
preoccupation with global warming and other "scientifically"
induced fears did not start with State of Fear or the global
warming thriller, The Day After Tomorrow.126 In 1871, Lt. Col.
George Tomkyns Chesney wrote a story for Blackwood's
Magazine titled "The Battle of Dorking," recounting an attack
on the town of Dorking, England in order to shock the British
123. Id. at 295. As they further note, it undermines the ability to pursue rights
based causes in the legal system while at the same time diverting attention away from
the "chronic tendency of U.S. political institutions to leave so much for the judiciary to
do in formulating and administering social policy." Id.
124. Gary Trudeau, Doonesbury, Oct. 15, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.com/comics/daily.asp?sFile=db061015 (last visited Oct. 10, 2009).
125. Fraidy Cat Nation: The Only Thing We Have to Fear is the Hype Over Fear
Itself, WASH. POST NAT'L WKLY. EDITION, Dec. 12-18, 2005, at 10. The article reports on
the rash of headlines that seek to induce fear from a number of causes: 'Terrorism.
Weapons of mass destruction. Bird flu. Hurricanes. Sex offenders. New and terrible
forms of cancer. Sexually transmitted diseases. Alzheimer's. Crystal meth labs.
Lawsuits. Prison breaks! ...." It concludes: 'The land is in lockdown." The article
points to Washington D.C. as the nation's amygdala, the organ of the brain that
processes fear, and is capable of processing only one emotion at a time. "So if you are
busy fueling your amygdala with fear, the courage, passion, laughter can't get in." The
article then details the ways in which the government and the media have used fear,
although while it "may be good for business .... it's bad for the national psyche." Id.
126. THE DAY AFrER TOMORROW (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation 2004).
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government into doing more to prepare for wars in the
future. 127 "[Y]et reaction to it showed that to the reading
public the two sensations [shock and entertainment] were
intertwined. Chesney had accidentally invented the
thriller."12s
The prevalent theme of thrillers is "an uneasiness about
technological change.129 Many of Crichton's stories have been
labeled "techno-thrillers," capturing the combination of
science and technology as the source of the thrill, and possibly
our salvation from it. In this genre, the scientific
phenomenon itself becomes one of the characters in the story,
as global warming does in State of Fear. This is not unusual;
for example, the aliens and their advanced technology are
characters in War of the Worlds. 30 The characterization of the
science is essential to the plot. Commenting on another work
by H.G. Wells, he notes that "[t]he book's main character is
the nuclear chain reaction itself: a phenomenon portrayed in
such intimate and creepy detail that it seems almost like a
living thing."' 3' The point of this literary diversion is that
stories, whether called "thrillers" or "literature," have great
power to animate people. Arguably, this kind of fiction is
"essential" in a democracy because it can, by a "careful,
thoroughly honest search for and analysis of values[,]...
exploref, open-mindedly, to learn what it should teach." 32
127. Tom Reiss, Imagining the Worst: How a Literary Genre Anticipated the Modern
World in THE NEW YORKER 106 (Nov. 28, 2005). His story spawned a host of imitators,
of which the most well known, even to this day, is H.G. Wells' War of the Worlds
published in 1898. Id. at 109.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. H.G. WELLS, WAR OF THE WORLDS (Aerie Books1898).
131. Id. at 114 (commenting on Wells' "The World Set Free'). Reiss chronicles how
Leo Szilard, a physicist, after reading the novel in German, "conceived how a nuclear
weapon might actually be built" and sent a chapter to Sir Hugo Hirst, the founder of
British General Electric with a letter in which he wrote "The forecast of the writers
may prove to be more accurate than the forecast of the scientists. The physicists have
conclusive arguments as to why we cannot create at present new sources of energy....
I am not so sure whether they do no miss the point;"' thus anticipating the development
of nuclear energy and the atomic revolution. Id.
132. JOHN GARDNER, ON MORAL FICTION 19 (Basic Books, Inc. 1978). Gardner states
that: "True art is by its nature moral," although he also notes that we are "embarrassed
by this idea," finding it "unfashionable." Id. at 25. Gardner defines morality to mean
"nothing more than doing what is unselfish, helpful, kind and noble-hearted, and doing
it with at least a reasonable expectation that in the long run as well as the short we
won't be sorry for what we've done, whether or not it was against some petty human
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Jumping from literature to social science, it is perhaps
ironic that Cass Sunstein, in Laws of Fear: Beyond the
Precautionary Principle1 3 attacks the same principle that
apparently animated Crichton to write State of Fear. Both
men eschew "the precautionary principle."134Sunstein, noting
that there are myriad formulations of the principle, defines it
generically as "the animating idea ... that regulators should
take steps to protect against potential harms, even if causal
chains are unclear and even if we do not know that those
harms will come to fruition."'135 At numerous points, Sunstein
condemns the principle as being "literally incoherent, . . . it is
therefore paralyzing; it forbids the very steps it requires."136
Rather than a novel, Sunstein presents his view in a scholarly
book that is half the size of Crichton's novel. For that reason,
it is far less likely, as Haltom and McCann point out, to come
to the notice of the reading public. 137
Regardless, Sunstein's careful dissection and rejection of
the precautionary principle serves to illustrate the book that
State of Fear could have been if Crichton had been interested
in writing a "moral tale" rather than a ponderously ideological
law. Moral action is action which affirms life." Id. at 23. Read as a whole, Gardner's
work suggests that the moral is the equivalent of agape-like love for the world acted out
in the character of the hero.
133. CASS SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
(Cambridge University Press 2005) [herinafter LAWS OF FEAR].
134. CRICHTON, FEAR, supra note 3, at 571. "The 'precautionary principle,' properly
applied, forbids the precautionary principle. It is self-contradictory. The precautionary
principle therefore cannot be spoken of in terms that are too harsh." Id.
135. LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 133 at 4.
136. Id.; See also id. at 13-14.
137. DISTORTING THE LAW, supra note 112, at 100-09. Haltom and McCann note
that most scholarship is "relatively unknown to journalists and citizens, virtually
ceding the contest for influence to proponents of familiar common sense" because it is
"relatively inaccessible," because "the same rigor to which the social scientist proudly
aspires generally produces tedious impediments for the nonexperts." Id. at 100, 102.
Calling for scholars "to connect their powerful debunking efforts to more artful
narratives" they characterize this as a moral battle not just an empirical one. Id. at
109. They state "If we are correct that the reformers' assault on excessive litigation
represents a moral crusade as much or more than an empirical challenge, then
normative arguments about justice, democracy, and social responsibility define the
terrain on which the primary political battle must be waged. Scholarly dismissals of
the 'politics of ideas' - as if this politics were somehow impure or dishonest - retreats
from the challenge of demonstrating how individualistic moral frames obscure key
issues, how such frames displace concerns about power, how norms of responsibility
might be applied differently, and a host of other possible challenges to neoliberal and
neoconservative values." Id. at 108.
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cant. Sunstein's thesis that the "precautionary principle,"
defined as the principle that in the face of uncertainty and
doubt about potential hazards, regulators should take steps to
protect from potential harms even if uncertain about the
cause and the timeframe in which harm may occur,' 38 is
incoherent. He locates this book in an extended meditation
on "fear, democracy, rationality, and the law."139 Like
Crichton, he wants to understand how government and the
law should respond to public fear, locating the solution in the
framework of deliberative democracy. 140 Along the way, he
provides useful insights, garnered from social science and
neuroeconomics, about how human beings construct fear.
Sunstein outlines a number of theories that seek to
explain why people, and their governments, have such a
difficult time regulating in the face of potentially large
dangers like global warming. Much of the difficulty is rooted
in human behavior, and he seeks to explain this by reference
to several theories. First, he notes that the "prospect theory"
explains fear of "significant harms that have a low probability
of occurring."141 Governments will sometimes follow their
populace in this regard, and wrongly apply the precautionary
principle to low-probability risks of serious harm. This is an
ill-advised strategy because the precautionary principle does
not tell us the "right" amount of precaution or what a
reasonable cost for the precaution might be. Ultimately, it,
that is, the precautionary principle, "forbids all course of
action, including regulation" and he applies this to the cases
of genetic modification of goods, global warming, nuclear
power, arsenic in drinking water, and the impact of military
exercises on marine life.142 Avoidance of these risks can
impose their own costs, whatever form of regulation is
undertaken.'43
138. LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 133, at 4.
139. Id. at 1.
140. Id. at 1-9. Sunstein discusses global warming as well as other "fears," noting
that the European community has more warmly embraced the precautionary principle
than has the United States. Id. at 13-24. In the course of this discussion, he notes that
there are "weak" and "strong" versions of the precautionary principle, as well as an
infinite number of models in between.
141. Id. at 26.
142. Id. at 26-28.
143. It should be noted that unlike Crichton, Sunstein does recognize that "there is
general agreement that global warming is in fact occurring" although "[sicientists are
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Second, Sunstein points to the "availability heuristic,
probability neglect, loss aversion, belief in the benevolence of
nature, and system neglect" to demonstrate how politics can
exploit these behavioral and cognitive traits to explain how
the operation of fear and precaution can determine the
regulations a particular polity might adopt. 144 All of these
devices are ones that all human beings use to deal with the
incomprehensible, be it global warming or the threat of
nuclear war. Briefly explained, the availability of the
heuristic captures our tendency to "assess the magnitude of
risks by asking whether [familiar] examples [or comparisons]
can come readily to mind."'145 If so, we are more likely to be
frightened. This can be magnified by our familiarity with a
particular object of fear as well as its salience. For example,
seeing a burning house is more frightening than reading
about it. What is "available" will vary from culture to culture,
depending upon the social context of that culture, e.g., its
media, its government, etc. 146
A third feature of our assessment of risk of harm,
according to Sunstein, comes from probability neglect.
Different from the availability heuristic, which can produce
"inaccurate assessments of probability," probability neglect
describes our failure to assess probability or likelihood at all,
especially if a strong emotion is involved.147 Here, Sunstein
points to global warming as a place where we have focused on
worst case scenarios and then called for aggressive regulation,
without necessarily assessing all of the evidence and the
probabilities in each case. While in the case of global
warming, he notes that this reaction may seem "warranted,"
his point is to demonstrate how our ability to visualize
imagery about harm matters "a great deal to people's
reactions to risks."'148 Images of rising water levels and of
New York under layers of snow and ice, as depicted in the
movie Day After Tomorrow,'49 can crowd "out probability
judgments."' 50  He concludes at this point, "[i]n many
not in accord about the dangers associated with" it. Id. at 27.
144. Id. at 35.
145. Id. at 36.
146. Id. at 36-39.
147. Id. at 39.
148. Id. at 40.
149. DAY AFTER TOMORROW, supra note 126.
150. LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 133 at 40.
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contexts, the law itself is a response to fear of bad outcomes
without close attention to the question of probability. . ."151
This lack of attention to probability is compounded by the
operation of our tendency to be loss averse, and to be more
comfortable with "familiar risks [rather] than unfamiliar
ones, even if they are statistically equivalent."' 152 People are
more worried about the statistically low probability of a
terrorist event rather than the higher and statistically
predictable likelihood of death or injury in a car accident.153
Finally, Sunstein introduces our completely counterfactual
belief in the benevolence of nature, i.e. that "nature implies
safety" and "system neglect."154 The last trait, system neglect,
is particularly important because it means that "much of the
time, people neglect the systemic effect of one-shot
interventions."'1 55 In turn, people tend to forget or ignore that
changing one part of a system will affect the other parts, and
that "people fail to see the frequent need to weigh competing
variables against one another."156
The blind application of the precautionary principle, in the
face of these human characteristics, means that we tend to
take drastic precautions against something that may well be
statistically rare, and empirically unstudied without
understanding how to evaluate whether a "drastic," rather
than "small, reversible" intervention, may be the better
precautionary approach.
One of Sunstein's reactions to this quandary is to suggest
that the precautionary principle, acting alone and in the face
of these human characteristics, does not provide a "sensible
151. Id. at 39-41. Sunstein undertakes a sustained analysis of probability neglect
and its relation to fear, noting that people often ignore probability in the face of strong
emotions such as fear. Id. at 67-88. This may lead regulators to engage "in extensive
regulation precisely because intense emotional reactions are making people relatively
insensitive to the (low) probability that dangers will ever come to fruition." Id. at 69.
Similarly, he notes that many people cannot evaluate low probabilities of risk, and thus
ignore the difference between "1/100,000 and 1/1,000,000." Id. at 73.
152. Id. at 42.
153. Id. at 43.
154. In this sense, Crichton and Sunstein agree that the belief that nature is
benevolent may be ill-founded; in fact, they would probably agree that the opposite is
true - at times, nature is sinister.
155. Id. at 45.
156. LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 133, at 44-46. This last variant of system neglect he
calls "tradeoff neglect."
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basis for structuring democratic discussion."157 In order for
deliberative democracy to make intelligent precautionary
choices, there needs to be more information, and "uncertainty
and irreversibility should lead to a sequential decision-
making process.158 In this regard, he points to global
warming as an example, stating that the precautionary
principle has caused us to go "all out" without assessing the
losses or costs to certain avenues of regulation. 159 As we make
our way to an informed response to risk, Sunstein notes,
echoing Mill, that an honest appraisal of the likelihood of
harm should diminish the danger of interest-group
manipulation because he deems public alarm a harm of its
own.' 60 Thus, a "sensible approach to risk" will address public
fear, even if baseless. 161
By the end, in addition to proposing an alternate to the
precautionary principle, Sunstein also discusses the role of
the media and government to address risk in the face of these
embedded human characteristics. Government, most likely
because it is the collection of citizens acting under conditions
of imposed rationality, can "permit deliberation" and "do a lot
better" than, say, the ordinary person confronted with an
emergency. 16 2 He acknowledges that "it should be clear that
news sources do a great deal to trigger fear, simply by offering
examples of situations in which the 'worst case' has actually
come to fruition.163 But unlike Crichton, this is not the
product of some great conspiracy, but rather that the media
suffer from the same availability heuristic and probability
157. Id. at 55.
158. Id. at 59.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 63.
161. Id. at 63. Contrast, however, what Gardner has to say about a belief in free
speech and the war of ideas: "But... what we generally get in our books and films is
bad instruction .... The Jeffersonian ideal that truth will emerge, in his reckoning, is
an empty theory that 'lie[s] then, in an excessively timid idea of democracy." GARDNER,
supra note 132, at 42.
162. LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 133, at 87.
163. Id. at 88. See also id. at 102 ("[I]n the real world, some voices are more
important than others, especially when availability and salience are involved. In
particular, the behavior and preoccupations of the media play a large role. Many
perceived 'epidemics' are in reality no such thing, but instead a product of media
coverage of gripping, unrepresentative incidents." Thus, rather than attributing media
coverage of these events to the "PLM," he notes that "media's coverage reflects its
economic self-interest" to attract attention and boost ratings.)
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neglect as do most citizens. In this sense, government and
institutions like the media can matter: "A deliberative
democracy would attempt to create institutions that have a
degree of immunity from short-term public alarm.164 In the
end, reminiscent of John Dewey and Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Sunstein states what we ought to do:
If we are committed to a deliberative conception of
democracy, we will be neither populists nor technocrats. Law
and policy ought not to reflect people's blunders; democracies
should not mechanically follow citizens' fears, or for that
matter their fearlessness. Nor does anything here suggest the
virtues of rule by a technocratic elite. As I have suggested,
citizens make qualitative distinctions among quantitatively
identical risks, and when their reflective values account for
those qualitative distinctions, the judgments of the citizens
deserve respect.165
As he moves to create an anti-catastrophe principle that
recognizes both the role of economics, cost-benefit and a
Rawlsian assessment of values that may dictate a particular
outcome regardless of the cost, Sunstein suggests that in a
deliberative democracy the government will need to do a
better job of educating the populace about risks and disclosing
information about them.166 "At a minimum, any disclosure, if
it is worthwhile, should be accompanied by efforts to enable
people to put the risk in context."167 For Sunstein, this
164. Id. at 88. Some recent commentators, including Crichton, suggested that this
may not be true of our government in recent years. See Michael Spector, Political
Science: The Bush Administration's War on the Laboratory," NEW YORKER, Mar. 13,
2006, at 58. The relation between the scientific community and the political one
matters deeply: "Science largely dictated the political realities of the twentieth
century." Id. at 61. Says one scientist in response to the Bush administration's efforts
to politicize science, "You can't do science without understanding that theories are
public and views often clash. You resolve differences by experiments and research, not
by toeing the line." Id. at 62. In the example of whether the government should begin
needle exchange to prevent HIV transmission, which both Clinton and Bush opposed,
another scientist said, importantly, "As a scientist, the answer has to be I believe in the
data.... Asking the question 'Do you believe in needle exchange?' is a real violation of
science. It so happens that needle exchange is a good public-health measure. And we
need also to understand that there are issues in society that will trump scientific
information. For many people, this is one of them. That is a political decision, and I
have no problem with politicians making it. But that is a terribly unfair question to put
to a scientist." Id. at 64.
165. LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 133, at 105-06.
166. Id. at 124.
167. Id.
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approach means that "[g]overnment ought to treat its citizens
with respect" and not "manipulate" what we now know about
creating fear.168 But recognizing that this fear may
sometimes be inescapable, he states that the government
should reject regulation when "there is no good reason for it,"
and that such a government will "suggest[] the importance of
ensuring a large role for specialists in the regulator
process."169 That said, however, he is direct in saying that
"[n]othing in a cost-benefit analysis can solve the evaluative
questions."170 Therefore, in a deliberative democracy,
regulatory choices should be made after a debate about
preferences and values. "I have suggested that a good
constitutional system is a deliberative democracy, not a
maximization machine. Many social judgments should be
made by citizens engaged in deliberative discussion with one
another rather than by aggregating the individual choices of
consumers."171 This is because for some targets of regulation,
e.g. sexual harassment or endangered species, the choice is
ultimately an informed value choice rather than an economic
one. 172 After suggesting that libertarian paternalism may be
an approach government takes to regulation, Sunstein
concludes:
Fear is an ineradicable part of human life. Often it points us in the
right directions. Nations, no less than individuals, pay attention to
it. But in democratic societies, governments do not capitulate to
the fears of their citizens, or pretend that a general idea of
precaution can provide helpful guidance. Democratic governments
care about facts as well as fears. Because they respect liberty and
self-government, and because they want to improve human lives,
they listen closely to what people have to say. But for the same
reasons, they take careful steps to ensure that laws and policies
reduce, and do not replicate, the errors to which fearful people are
prone. 173
168. Id. at 125.
169. Id. at 126.
170. Id. at 131.
171. Id. at 158.
172. Id. He addresses global warming, noting 'Phere is no good a-contextual way of
calculating the aggregate costs of global climate change by 2050; actually that is a
ludicrous question, because it does not have any point." Id. at 171-74. A far more
sensible question is whether it would make sense for any particular nation to accept a
particular way of responding to the problem, such as the Kyoto protocol." Id. at 171.
173. Id. at 226.
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Annihilation, whether it be at the hands of nuclear
weapons, toxic bacteria or global warming, is terrifying, and
for that reason can make great fiction. In the case of State of
Fear, Crichton could have advanced the discussion about the
role of government, law, science and the media in responding
to global warming by also creating a moral fiction. Above, I
have demonstrated that lawyers are not part of a conspiracy
to usurp the right of citizens to make informed choices about
global warming policy. In fact, the opposite is true. Working
as cause-lawyers, and hopefully gaining a greater knowledge
of science, they help to further our deliberation about policy.
As much as Crichton lambastes trial lawyers, it may be that
the now rare trial provides another forum for our discussions.
Consider this comment about one of the intelligent design
trials:
The trial also allowed the lawyers to act as proxies for the rest of
us, and ask of scientists questions that we'd probably be too
embarrassed to ask ourselves. In a courtroom, you must lay an
intellectual foundation in order to earn a line of questioning-and
so the lawyers stripped matters neatly back to the first principles of
science. Considering how often it is said that evolution is 'just' a
theory, for instance, it is clear that many people either do not know
or do not accept the scientific definition of a theory. The lawyers
for the pro-evolution side went to great lengths to make the point
that, although all science is provisional, a scientific theory is a
powerful explanation that unites a large body of facts and relies on
testable hypotheses. As Padian testified, it is not 'something that
we think of in the middle of the night after too much coffee and not
enough sleep.174
As John Gardner points out, a book of moral fiction that
attempts to create true heroes and wrestles with impossible
human dilemmas is its own experiment. "True art imitates
nature's total process: endless blind experiment... and then
ruthless selectivity. Art, in sworn opposition to chaos,
discovers by its process what it can say. That is art's
morality."175 It is not surprising that where the "characters
are stick figure - cartoons of good and evil - and where plot is
kept minimal and controlled by message, not by the
developing will of life like human beings" that Crichton fails
174. Margaret Talbot, Darwin in the Dock: Intelligent Design has its Day in Court,
NEW YORKER, Dec. 5, 2005, at 66, 68.
175. GARDNER, supra note 132, at 14.
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us by allowing the characters, within their character, to
confront the reality of being a lawyer for a cause such as the
environment.176 Crichton fails all of his characters, which
"exist for the sake of the predetermined message, not as
subjects for the artist's open-minded exploration of what he
can honestly say."177 And in so doing, he fails us all.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 85. He later notes that discoveries are made while asking whether a
character would do that, a question that Crichton fails repeatedly to ask. Id. at 109.
The test of the theory would be in 'lifelike situations" that create the suspense of the
novel [rather than technological feats], because ultimately fiction "deals in
understanding, not knowledge." Id. at 114, 135.
